We show how to use Hurwitz polynomials to study the stability and uniqueness of Rational Expectation equilibria in Dynamic General Equilibrium models. We apply this method to a model characterized by staggered wage and price contracts and by limited asset market participation (LAMP). We prove analytically in a fourth-order dynamics system that, once nominal wage stickiness is taken into account, LAMP does not invalidate the Taylor Principle: for any plausible degree of asset market participation an active interest rate rule ensures the uniqueness of the rational expectation equilibrium.
Determinacy analysis in high order dynamic systems: The case of nominal rigidities and limited asset market participation
Introduction
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we show how to use Hurwitz polynomials to study the stability and uniqueness of Rational Expectation Equilibria (REE) in Dynamic General Equilibrium models. Hurwitz polynomials are used to transform the polynomial derived from the characteristic equation, as in Felippa and Park (2004) , to deal analytically with the conditions for determinacy.
1 Second, we apply our methodology to a New Keynesian (NK) model characterized by staggered wage and price contracts together with limited asset market participation (LAMP). We thus assess analytically how nominal wage stickiness a¤ects the results in Bilbiie (2008) . In our model wage and price stickiness arises from the standard Calvo-type mechanism. As in Galì et al. (2004 Galì et al. ( , 2007 , Bilbiie (2008) and in a number of recent studies, LAMP is modeled assuming that a portion of agents face a liquidity constraint such that they spend their current labor income in each period. The resulting framework nests two popular environments in the monetary policy literature: Bilbiie (2008) and Erceg et al. (2000) . Bilbiie (2008) studies determinacy properties of simple interest rate rules and optimal monetary policy in a NK economy with LAMP and a frictionless labor market. In such a setting, determinacy of the REE requires the inversion of the Taylor principle, that is, the nominal interest rate needs to react less than one-to-one to in ‡ation. Erceg et al. (2000) develop a full participation NK model characterized by both staggered prices and wages which features an endogenous trade-o¤ between the stabilization of the output gap, price in ‡ation and wage in ‡ation.
Our model can be represented as a fourth order dynamic system characterized by both predetermined and forward looking variables. Despite the high order of the model dynamic system, our methodology allows us to provide analytical conditions for the determinacy of the REE. We prove that once nominal wage stickiness, an incontrovertible empirical fact, is taken into account, LAMP does not invalidate the Taylor Principle: for any plausible share of non-Ricardian agents an active interest rate rule ensures the uniqueness of the rational expectation equilibrium. Colciago (2011) shows numerically that wage stickiness helps restoring the standard Taylor Principle as a necessary condition for determinacy in the presence of LAMP. We apply our methodology to prove analytically the generality of this numerical result. This is possible since our methodology allows to obtain analytical determinacy conditions in high order dynamic systems. As such, the proposed methodology will be a very useful instrument for many researchers in macroeconomics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows how to use Hurwitz polynomials for the study of uniqueness and stability, Section 3 applies the method to a NK model with LAMP and Section 4 concludes.
Methodology
Consider a system of linear di¤erence equations in the form
where z t is a nx1 vector including n 1 predetermined variables and n 2 non-predetermined variables, where n = n 1 + n 2 . A is a nxn coe¢ cient matrix. The characteristic polynomial 1 In the remainder we use the terms uniqueness and determinacy as sinonimous.
associated to matrix A is P C ( ) = n + a 1 n 1 + ::a i n i + :: + a n 1 + a n :
The stability and uniqueness properties of the solution to (1) would depend on the location of the roots of P C ( ) inside the unit circle j j < 1. In particular, Blanchard and Kahn (BK henceforth, 1980) show that (1) has a stable and unique solution if (2) has n 2 roots larger than one in absolute value and n 1 roots lower than one in absolute value. Verifying if BK conditions are satis…ed can be cumbersome, particularly so as n gets larger and when both n 1 and n 2 di¤er from zero, i.e. if z t contains both predetermined and non-predetermined variables.
To help obtaining analytical results on the stability properties of the dynamic system (2) ; Felippa and Park (2004) illustrates the strategy of transforming the polynomial P C ( ) in an Hurwitz polynomial, P H (s); by applying the conformal involuntary transformation
Given (3), it is easy to check that j j 7 1 , s 7 0: Expanding the polynomial, one obtains a quotient of two polynomials:P H (s) =
where the roots ofP H (s) are the roots of P H (s). The uniqueness and stability properties of P H (s) depend on the location of the roots in the left-hand plane <(s) 0. The dynamic system (1) has a stable and unique solution if the Hurwitz polynomial associated to (2) has n 2 roots larger than zero and n 1 roots lower than zero. To check how many roots are positive and how many are negative in a high order polynomial is a much simpler task than to check how many roots are within or outside the unit circle. Moreover, in standard microfounded macro-models the sign of the parameters de…ning functional forms is usually known, while their magnitude is not. As a result verifying if these conditions are satis…ed is more straightforward then verifying if the traditional BK conditions are.
In the next section we apply the methodology just explained to a NK model with price and wage stickiness and LAMP. Importantly, despite the dynamic system is 4th order, we provide analytical determinacy conditions.
Application: A NK model with nominal rigidities and LAMP
To guide the reader through the methodology described above we consider a NK model characterized by: (i) staggered wage and price contracts; (ii) LAMP, that is, a fraction 2 [0; 1] of agents do not participate to the …nancial markets and simply consume their labor income. The model economy is spelled out in detail in Ascari et al. (2015) . 2 The following 2 The reduce form of the model is derived under the assumption that each union pools the labor income of agents, leading Ricardian and non-Ricardian households to work for the same amount of time. This implies that under ‡exible wages the model does not fully nest Bilbiie (2008) , where Ricardian and non-Ricardian agents are free to make di¤erent labor choices. However, our …ndings do not depend on the chosen structure of the labor market. In an on-line Appendix, available on the web-page of the authors, we investigate an alternative labor market arrangement that allows to fully nest Bilbiie (2008) . This alternative labor market setting does not invalidate our results, which, on the contrary, are strengthened. We take the labor market setting in the main text as the baseline because we regard it as a more rigorously microfounded. equations summarize log-linear equilibrium dynamics of the model around the e¢ cient steady state:
We assume that ‡uctuations are determined by exogenous shocks to labor productivity and by taste shocks. The log-labor productivity is denoted by a t , while taste shocks are denoted in logs by t . Equation (M 1) is the NKPC obtained from the …rms'price setting problem. The variable t represent deviations of current in ‡ation from its (zero) steady state,! t = ! t !
Ef f t
represents the real wage gap, which is de…ned as the gap between the current and the e¢ cient equilibrium real wage. The latter is determined uniquely by technology, ! Ef f t = a t : The
is the slope of the NKPC, where is the subjective discount factor in the agents'utility function and p is the Calvo-probability for a …rm of not being able to change its price. The variable ; where w is the Calvo-probability for a labor union of not being able to change its wage. The variable x t = y t y Ef f t denotes the output gap, i.e. the gap between actual output and the e¢ cient output, which reads as y . To close the model we consider the same interest rate rule as in Bilbiie (2008) 
Abstracting from shocks, the relevant system to study the determinacy of REE can be represented in matrix forms as in (1) 
The 4th-order characteristic polynomial reads as
The latter can be transformed into the Hurwitz polynomial by using = 1+s 1 s . In this casẽ
Hence one needs to study the stability properties of the following Hurwitz polynomial P H (s) =ã 4 |{z} a 1 +a 2 +a 3 +a 4 +1 a 2 a 1 a 3 +a 4 +1
The REE is determinate i¤:
where
While the proof is in Appendix A.1, here we want to sketch it to show how to apply the methodology we propose. The key point is to apply the transformation in (6) to go from the characteristic polynomial of matrix A
to the associated Hurwitz polynomial
+s 2 2 6 6 4
This polynomial should exhibit 3 positive roots and 1 negative root for the REE to be unique. This is a much easier condition to check than checking whether 3 roots and 1 root of P C ( ) are outside and inside the unit circle, respectively. The proof in the Appendix simply analyses the signs of the coe¢ cientsã i , and exploits the Decartes'rule of sign for polynomials. On top of the methodological aspect, Proposition 1 analytically illustrates the second contribution of the paper. As in Bilbiie (2008) , there is a region of the parameter space where the Taylor principle is inverted: when F R < 1; needs to be lower than 1 to yield a unique REE. However, the condition F R < 1 implicitly de…nes a threshold value, F R ; for the fraction of non-asset holders
The value of F R depends on the model parameters, and, in particular, on the degree of wage stickiness. Figure 1 depicts determinacy areas in the space ( ; ). The solid curved line represents the threshold value F R described in Proposition 1 as a function of . Note that F R decreases with the degree of LAMP, . If = 0; F R > 1, and the standard Taylor principle holds. As increases, however, F R decreases, and the interval for described in case 1) of Proposition 3 shrinks and eventually becomes empty when = F R : As increases further, then, condition
2) applies and the interval for in the inverted Taylor principle case enlarges, becoming 2 ( 1; 1) at the limit when ! 1: What is the e¤ect of wage stickiness? Wage stickiness shifts to the right the F R curve,
3 Hence, the threshold value F R increases with the degree of wage stickiness.
As w tends to 0; i.e. with …x wages, then F R ! 1; and the Taylor principle is restored, because Proposition 1 guarantees determinacy if and only if 2 (1; 1). On the contrary, in the case of ‡exible wages ( w ! 1) as in Bilbiie (2008) , the threshold value becomes F R;f w =
+ +1
; that is lower than
To give a quantitative ‡avour of Proposition 1, Figure 2 depicts indeterminacy regions in the parameter space ( ; ), obtained by numerical simulations.
4 Panel (i) displays the case of ‡exible wages. A share of non-Ricardian agents larger than 0:167 requires the inverted Taylor Principle to ensure equilibrium uniqueness. Thus, "the inverted Taylor principle holds 'generically' (i.e., if we exclude some extreme values for some of the parameters)" (Bilbiie, 2008, p. 180) . Panel (ii) refers to the case of sticky wages, with an average duration of wage contracts equal to three quarters. 5 Unless the share of non-Ricardian consumers assumes rather extreme values -not compatible with existing estimates -the Taylor Principle leads to equilibrium determinacy. Thus, wage stickiness "generically" restores standard determinacy conditions. 3 Recall that the higher the degree of stickiness in wages, the lower is w : 4 Our calibration is standard. Time is measured in quarters. The discount factor is set to 0:99; so that the annual interest rate amounts to 4%. The utility parameters and are equal to 2 and 3, respectively. According to the estimates in Basu and Fernald (1997) the value added mark-up of prices over marginal cost is around 20%, for this reason we set p to 6: We assign an identical value to the elasticity of substitution between labor inputs, w . We set p = w = 0:75, which implies an average duration of price and wage contracts of one year, a value which is in compatible with most available empirical estimates (see for example Smets and Wouters 2003 and Levin et al. 2005) . The Figure reproduces the main result in Colciago (2011) .
5 To understand that Figure 1 and panel (ii) of Figure 2 are equivalent, recall that Proposition 1 only focuses on the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for determinacy of the REE, and do not consider the di¤erence between indeterminacy and instability whenever the REE is not unique. Moreover, given our calibration, the curve that de…nes F R in the space ( ; ) is almost horizontal at F R and it bends only for extreme values of (or ):
Corollary. Numerical results. Let i t = t+1 . Under sticky wages and sticky prices the Taylor Principle is a necessary condition for equilibrium determinacy for all the plausible parameterizations of the share of non-Ricardian agents.
To gain some intuition about how the interaction between non Ricardian agents and wage stickiness a¤ects determinacy, consider the following mental experiment, which builds on Bilbiie (2008) . After monetary policy increases in the interest rate, Ricardian agents reduce their demand, while the …rms that cannot change their price reduce labor demand. The labor demand curve thus shifts inward and under ‡exible wages this translates into a reduction in the real wage -the more so the higher the elasticity of the marginal disutility of hours,
; and the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, . The decrease in the real wage depresses demand by non-Ricardian agents and reinforces the e¤ects on aggregate demand due to the initial increase in the real interest rate. However, as emphasized by Bilbiie (2008) , this e¤ect is not monotonic in . The sizeable decrease in the real wage, and hence in marginal costs, together with the small change in hours, and hence in output and sales, imply a potential increase in pro…ts. This leads, in turn, to a positive wealth e¤ect on Ricardian agents. The latter is stronger the larger , since Ricardian agents would obtain a higher individual dividend income. If asset market participation is restricted enough, the positive income e¤ect may counteract the substitution e¤ect induced by the interest rate change and …nally lead to an increase in aggregate demand. Bilbiie (2008) names this region of the parameter space Inverted Aggregate Demand Logic, because it implies the inversion of the slope of the IS curve: an increase in the interest rate leads to an increase in aggregate demand. When this happens, then the Taylor principle obviously inverts too. Consider now the case of sticky wages. The inward shift in labor demand due to the reduction in consumption by Ricardian agents after the interest rate increase, now results in a modest reduction in the real wage because of wage stickiness. The increase in pro…ts is thus dampened with respect to the case of ‡exible wages. For this reason under wage stickiness the inversion of the IS curve requires a much larger share of non Ricardian agents to magnify the, eventual, wealth e¤ect at the individual level for the Ricardian agents (see Ascari et al., 2015) . Hence, for any given share of non Ricardian agents, the inversion of the slope of the IS curve becomes more likely as wages become more ‡exible.
Finally, price stickiness has instead the opposite e¤ect on F R : the threshold value, F R decreases with the degree of price stickiness (lower p ) because
In the case of ‡exible prices and sticky wages, the model becomes isomorphic to a fully Ricardian economy, would not matter and hence the standard Taylor principle applies: the REE is unique i¤ 2 1; 1 + 2 (1+ )
.
Contemporaneous Taylor rules
First, we consider the contemporaneous rule i t = t : The Appendix shows that the method can be applied also in this case despite the high order dimension of the relevant matrix. Note that if = 1; then b;CR = 0; so that the standard Taylor principle holds for positive values of ; because the REE is always indeterminate for 0 < < 1, as in the standard case.
Wage stickiness shifts to the left both the a;CR and the b;CR curves in Figure 3 , because . Thus, as in the case of a forward rule, in an economy with ‡exible prices and sticky wages, the degree of LAMP has no e¤ect on the shape of the determinacy regions, and the Taylor principle holds, at least for positive values of :
From a numerical point of view, Figure 4 shows that the result in the Corollary is con…rmed also in the case of contemporaneous rule: under sticky wages, the Taylor principle is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the uniqueness of the REE, for all plausible values of (abstracting from highly negative values of ): This is not the case instead when wages are ‡exible, since the a;CR curve shifts downward. Indeed, a;CR = 0:831; in our standard calibration, while it lowers to 0.197 in the case of ‡exible wages.
8
In a model that features both sticky wages and sticky prices, both Erceg et al. (2000) and Galí (2008) numerically study the properties of a monetary policy rule that targets both price and wage in ‡ation, as i t = t + w w t : Galí (2008) numerically shows that, for 6 The Appendix shows that this Proposition assumes:
< 1: This condition holds for value of su¢ ciently close to one and for our benchmark calibration. Figure 3 . 8 Moreover, similarly to the case of the forward-looking rule, Figure 4 reveals that the curve a;CR is ‡at at a;CR ; given our standard calibration.
; w 2 (0; 1); the condition + w > 1 is necessary and su¢ cient (see also Flaschel et al., 2008) for the uniqueness of the REE. Applying the proposed methodology, Proposition 3 shows analytically that such a condition is still crucial in a model with LAMP.
Proposition 3. Price In ‡ation and Wage In ‡ation Targeting Rule Let
A necessary condition for the REE to be determined is either ( + w ) > max 1; ; w or ( + w ) < min 1; ; w where
The conditions in Proposition 3 refers now to the sum ( + w ). The threshold value ; w is increasing in . Thus, it is possible to de…ne a threshold for the share of non-Ricardian agents, such that if is lower than this threshold, ; w < 0 so that ( + w ) > 1 is a necessary condition for the uniqueness of the REE for positive values of both and w : This is always true for either …x wages or ‡exible prices.
Conclusions
We show how to use Hurwitz polynomials to study the stability and uniqueness of REE in Dynamic General Equilibrium models. We apply this method to provide analytical conditions for stability and uniqueness of the REE in a fourth-order dynamic model characterized by staggered wage and price contracts and by an arbitrary degree of asset market participation. Our model nests two widely used framework for the analysis of monetary policy: (i) the LAMP model by Bilbiie (2008) and (ii) the sticky prices-sticky wages model by Erceg et al. (2000) . Framework (i) features no wage stickiness and exhibits an inverted Taylor principle. Our results show that, once wage stickiness is considered, the determinacy properties of simple interest rules agree with the Taylor principle for values of the share of non-Ricardian agents consistent with the empirical estimates. This suggests that reappraisals of the conduct of monetary policy in speci…c past periods, such as that of the Great In ‡ation, based on the presence of non-Ricardian agents cannot neglect nominal wage stickiness, which is, in fact, an incontrovertible empirical fact.
A Technical Appendix

A.1 Forward Rule: Proof of Propositions 1
We consider the following policy rule
So the system is in matrix formulation (where 1 = ) : 
(10) The the coe¢ cient of the characteristic polynomial are 9 a 1 = trace(A) = sum of the principal …rst-order minors of A a 2 = sum of the principal second-order minors of A a 3 = sum of the principal third-order minors of A a 4 = det(A) (= principal of fourth-order). The characteristic polynomial is then equal to
Applying the above transformation in (6) to get the Hurwitz polynomial, it yields
Note there should be 3 positive roots and 1 negative root for the REE to be unique. It follows that a necessary condition must be thatã 4 < 0: Proof strategy: we look at the signs of the coe¢ cientsã i , and we exploit the Decartes'rule of sign.
Look separately at the case when > 1 and when < 1. Case > 1: a 4 ) In this case the numerator ofã 4 (i.e., Nã 4 ) 10 is negative, hence the denominator must be positive. For D to be positive, the following restriction must hold:
: a 3 ) Then, since D > 0, there are two cases: i) Nã 3 > 0 =>ã 3 > 0; that happens for low values of ; more precisely when <
Note that in this case
+ 1 > 1 and so the set is non empty. Moreover Nã 1 = 8 + 8
2 + 2 (1 ) [ ( w + p ) + w ( + )] < 0 =>ã 1 < 0: Whatever the sign ofã 2 , the signs of the coe¢ cients in (11) are: -,+,?,-,+. By Decartes' rule of sign, P H (s) then admits then 1 or 3 positive roots. However, P H ( s) = +,-,?,+,+, and hence there can be only one negative root. It follows that under the above conditions
the REE is determinate.
ii) Nã 3 < 0 =>ã 3 < 0; that happens for high values of ; more precisely when > w + p w ( + ) : In this case, however, the set : Hence now we are looking at values of such that
Since the …rst two coe¢ cients (ã 4 ;ã 3 ) are negative and the last is positive, it must be that a 2 > 0 andã 1 < 0 to have three signs inversions. This is always true if > 1 and (12) hold. It follows that under the above conditions
the REE is determinate. Putting together i) and ii), the equilibrium is determinate i¤
and
Case < 1: a 4 ) Nã 4 > 0; hence it must be that D < 0. For D to be negative, the following restriction must hold: + 1 < : In this case, however, the set
is non empty i¤:
a 3 ) Given (16); =) Nã 3 < 0 =>ã 3 > 0; since D < 0: In this case, since the …rst two coe¢ cients:ã 4 < 0;ã 3 > 0, and the last is positive, the only way to have three signs inversions is that at least one betweenã 2 andã 1 is negative (in other words they cannot be both positive).
Condition forã 2 < 0 => Nã 2 > 0 =>
which, if (15) holds, is satis…ed i¤:
In other words, (17) guarantees that 1 + : Hence (16) guarantees that at least one betweenã 2 andã 1 is negative. Decartes'rule of signs then implies 3 positive roots.
To conclude, in the case < 1, the equilibrium is determinate i¤
Putting together the two cases > 1 and < 1., it yields Proposition 1. QED
A.2 Contemporaneous Rule
We consider the following policy rule:
The corresponding matrix formulation of our dynamic system is: The coe¢ cients of the characteristic polynomial are:
Repeating the steps above in (6), the Hurwitz polynomial is given by:
Note there should be 3 positive roots and 1 negative root for the REE to be unique. It follows that a necessary condition must be thatã 4 < 0: As for the proof above in A.1, we look at the signs of the coe¢ cientsã i , and we exploit the Decartes'rule of sign.
A.2.1 Proof of Propositions 2: Case w = 0
If w = 0; the Hurwitz polynomial is:
Look separately at the case when > 1 and when < 1. Case > 1: a 4 ) In this case Nã 4 < 0, hence D must be positive. For D to be positive, the following restriction must hold:
a 3 ) Then, since D > 0, there are two cases: i) Nã 3 > 0 =>ã 3 > 0; that happens for:
Note that in this caseã 1 < 0; sinceã 1 = ã 3 8(1 2 ): It follows that, whatever the sign ofã 2 ; P H (s) exhibits three sign changes, while P H ( s) only one. So there will be 3 positive roots and 1 negative root. This proves that if is > max n 1; a;CR ;
ii) Nã 3 < 0 =>ã 3 < 0; that happens for: < 
Under this conditions, since the …rst two coe¢ cients (ã 4 ;ã 3 ) are negative and the last is positive, then it must be thatã 2 > 0 andã 1 < 0 to have three signs inversions.
: So determinacy can occur i¤ all the following conditions are jointly satis…ed:
2(1 )
It is easy to show that this case is extremely unlikely. First, since it should be is less than one to get rid of this case. So in what follows we will assume this mild condition, that is very likely to be satis…ed.
Case < 1: a 4 ) In this case Nã 4 > 0, hence D must be negative. Thus: 
Note that in this caseã 1 < 0; sinceã 1 = ã 3 8(1 2 ): It follows that, whatever the sign ofã 2 ; P H (s) exhibits three sign changes, while P H ( s) only one. So there will be 3 positive roots and 1 negative root. This proves that if is > min n 1; a;CR ;
b;CR o ; the REE is determinate.
ii) Nã 3 > 0 =>ã 3 < 0; that happens for: > Under this conditions, since the …rst two coe¢ cients (ã 4 ;ã 3 ) are negative and the last is positive, then it must be thatã 2 > 0 andã 1 < 0 to have three signs inversions. Condition forã 2 > 0 => Nã 2 < 0 => < 
